Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,115 copies47 likes38,518 views
11,679 detections
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Detects a specific privilege escalation and code execution chain attributed to the PUROSANGUE methodology. This activity involves using a COM Elevation Moniker (specifically with the 'Elevation:Administrator!new:' syntax) to bypass UAC, followed by process hollowing into ServiceModelReg.exe. The attack is initiated from unconventional parent processes such as vsdbg.exe or its associated DLL.
Detects specific Android device admin command sequences that indicate attempts to establish persistent access by hardening the device against removal (e.g., enabling uninstall protection, setting device admin passwords, disabling biometrics) or destructive actions like performing a factory reset or self-uninstallation.
Detects instances where common script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, etc.) are launched by developer-centric processes (node.exe, npm.exe, Code.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments often used for reconnaissance, payload downloading, or obfuscated command execution.
Detects instances where Microsoft Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) spawns common interpreters or command-line tools (such as node, python, cmd, or powershell) that are not associated with known internal VS Code process behaviors like renderer tasks or tunnel operations. This activity may indicate malicious use of the integrated terminal or extension execution contexts to execute unauthorized code.
Detects DNS queries for RatHat C2 panels using characteristic naming patterns and specific malicious domains, as well as outbound network connections to known RatHat C2 IP infrastructure.
Detects network traffic from mobile devices to the Google Gemini API (generativelanguage.googleapis.com) specifically targeting the 'generateContent' endpoint. This behavior is indicative of mobile malware (e.g., RatHat/PromptSpy) that may be utilizing AI-assisted UI-automation, potentially to exfiltrate screen content or automate malicious interactions by processing visual layout data through a generative model.
Detects Node.js or Python processes exhibiting behavior characteristic of information-stealing malware (such as the WaterPlum suite: BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, StoatWaffle). The rule monitors for these processes accessing sensitive files related to browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, scanned identification documents, or performing collection activities like keylogging and screen capturing.
Detects specific malicious archive payloads associated with NeedyMantis that contain a second-stage loader and spoofed system DLLs (e.g., dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll). These archives utilize XOR encoding or RtlDecompressBuffer packing and are designed for DLL sideloading.
Detects network traffic from mobile devices to the Google Gemini API (generativelanguage.googleapis.com) specifically targeting the 'generateContent' endpoint. This behavior is indicative of mobile malware (e.g., RatHat/PromptSpy) that may be utilizing AI-assisted UI-automation, potentially to exfiltrate screen content or automate malicious interactions by processing visual layout data through a generative model.
Detects the NeedyMantis first-stage loader (e.g., WinSparkle.dll variants) which employs anti-debug techniques such as NtQueryInformationProcess and ThreadHideFromDebugger, alongside stack-based string deobfuscation, to prepare for the extraction and execution of a secondary payload (e.g., encryptbase64.ps1).
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