Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,115 copies47 likes38,518 views
11,679 detections
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Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with a custom 'RatHat' malware variant utilizing Google's Gemini API for command and control or remote automation. The rule identifies the initial POST request to the API with specific generation parameters (temperature 0.1, 256 tokens) and the corresponding JSON-formatted coordinate response from the server.
Detects instances where node.exe or npm processes spawn a Python interpreter. This behavior is indicative of malicious activity, specifically the execution of second-stage payloads such as the InvisibleFerret backdoor often associated with the BeaverTail JavaScript loader, observed in software supply chain compromise campaigns.
Detects network connections to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, specifically cloudflare-dns.com and dns.google, as well as non-browser processes performing HTTPS requests to these IPs. Such traffic patterns are often indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication utilizing DoH to bypass network-level DNS filtering and monitoring.
Detects user authentication events to recruitment, career, or applicant-tracking applications where the connection originates from an anonymizing proxy, VPN, or datacenter IP address. This behavior has been observed as a precursor to North Korean IT worker recruitment fraud, where attackers mask their true geographic location to gain unauthorized employment.
Detects network connections to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, specifically cloudflare-dns.com and dns.google, as well as non-browser processes performing HTTPS requests to these IPs. Such traffic patterns are often indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication utilizing DoH to bypass network-level DNS filtering and monitoring.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands using '[scriptblock]::Create' in conjunction with character array decoding or large negative integer-array patterns. This technique is commonly used to deobfuscate and execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts at runtime.
Detects the execution of known Canon or Stardock software binaries (COTFileReadApp.exe, DeElevate64.exe) when spawned by msiexec.exe from non-standard locations such as Temp or AppData directories. This pattern is indicative of potential defense evasion, where adversaries leverage legitimate software to proxy execution or potentially perform side-loading activities.
Detects the creation of Windows Registry Run keys with names mimicking known applications (e.g., 'Canon Configuration Reader' or 'Stardock DeElevation Tool'). These naming patterns are highly suspicious and indicative of attempts to achieve persistence or perform defense evasion via registry-based autostart execution.
Detects instances where identified RAT-associated or potentially malicious parent processes spawn command-line interpreters (e.g., cmd, powershell) or execute archive management commands, which is indicative of secondary stage payload deployment or automated execution following initial compromise.
Detects network connection attempts to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolvers from specific binaries identified as host processes for SectopRAT, a malware often associated with ClickFix social engineering campaigns.
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