Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,048 copies47 likes38,293 views
11,679 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,760
1,874
1,586
966
944
Categories
4,878
3,246
1,529
1,303
1,122
Platforms
7,678
1,824
1,066
999
986
Products / Services
2,963
1,768
1,278
953
798
MITRE Techniques
3,615
3,555
2,488
1,474
1,186
CVEs
36
27
26
25
23
IDS Classtypes
360
113
38
24
24
IDS Protocols
315
114
93
47
10
Detects the creation or modification of WMI Event Subscriptions (Filters, Consumers, and Bindings) using administrative tools like wmic, powershell, or mofcomp. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate execution via WMI event triggers.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a user account authenticates via NTLM (Logon Type 3) to at least three different hosts within a 10-minute window and subsequently accesses administrative network shares (ADMIN$ or C$) on one or more of those target systems.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, powershell, diskshadow) to delete volume shadow copies or backup catalogs. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware operations intended to inhibit system recovery.
This rule detects various forms of process injection (Remote Thread, APC, Map View of Section) targeting common, high-value Windows processes such as explorer.exe, lsass.exe, and web browsers. This behavior is a common technique used by attackers to gain persistence, elevate privileges, or execute code within the context of legitimate system or user-level processes to evade detection.
Detects potential DNS tunneling or Command and Control (C2) activity by analyzing DNS query patterns. The rule identifies anomalous behavior based on high query volume, excessive unique subdomain fanout to a single parent domain, and unusually long average query lengths. This combination is often indicative of data exfiltration or communication with a C2 server over the DNS protocol.
Detects a sequence of multiple RDP authentication failures (Event ID 4625, Logon Type 10) from a specific source IP, followed by a successful RDP authentication (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 10) from the same source IP. This pattern indicates a successful credential brute force or password spraying attack against RDP, which is a common initial access vector for ransomware and lateral movement.
Detects Kerberos TGS requests using RC4 encryption (0x17), which is a common indicator of Kerberoasting. By monitoring Event IDs 4768 and 4769 for this specific encryption type, this rule identifies potential attempts to offline-crack service account passwords.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or Event ID 4698 that involve scripting interpreters (powershell, wscript, mshta, cmd) and suspicious command line arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as encoded commands, hidden windows, or network resource access, specifically when executing under the SYSTEM account context.
Detects Kerberos TGT (4768) or TGS (4769) tickets that exhibit anomalous characteristics often associated with forged tickets (e.g., Golden Ticket). The rule flags tickets using weak encryption (RC4-HMAC, legacy DES), tickets requested for stale/disabled accounts, or tickets with lifetimes exceeding standard domain policy thresholds.
This rule identifies potential lateral movement or account compromise by detecting accounts that have performed NTLM network logons or authentication (Events 4624/4776) without corresponding Kerberos pre-authentication or interactive logon events within a 15-minute window. This pattern often indicates the use of stolen credentials (e.g., Pass-the-Hash) to access network resources rather than standard interactive user activity.
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