Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects unauthorized creation or modification of AI agent system prompts, guardrails, or policy configuration files. This rule monitors for changes made by processes or users other than those identified as authorized CI/CD deployment agents or service accounts, helping to prevent unauthorized tampering with AI agent behavior or safety policies.
Detects anomalous, high-volume enumeration activity (List/Get/Read operations) performed by a single identity across multiple Azure resource providers within a short time window, indicative of automated reconnaissance by a compromised service principal or managed identity.
Detects instances where AI agent runtime processes (e.g., Python, Node.js) initiate child processes using common Windows Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBAS). This behavior may indicate an AI agent has been compromised or misused to execute unauthorized system commands for defense evasion or post-exploitation activities.
This rule detects unauthorized or anomalous outbound network connections from known AI agent runtime processes to LLM or API endpoints. It helps identify potential data exfiltration by monitoring for connections to destinations outside of an organization's approved allow-list for model providers, effectively catching scenarios where a compromised AI agent is prompted to relay sensitive data to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
Detects process execution patterns where a process, such as an AI agent runtime, accesses sensitive local credential stores, configuration files (.aws, .kube, .ssh, .env), or executes commands to dump environment variables containing sensitive keywords like API_KEY or SECRET. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting by an agent compromised or misconfigured to exfiltrate host-level secrets.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests initiated by the Windows PowerShell User-Agent where the destination host is a decimal-encoded IP address. This pattern is commonly associated with ClickFix-style social engineering attacks, where users are tricked into executing obfuscated PowerShell commands to download malicious payloads.
Detects network traffic directed towards known public DNS over HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, such as Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. Adversaries often abuse DoH to tunnel Command and Control (C2) communication, effectively blending in with legitimate web traffic to evade traditional DNS monitoring.
Detects a process reading credential store files (Login Data) from multiple Chromium-based browsers, immediately followed by an HTTP POST request to a specific exfiltration endpoint associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware.
Detects the abuse of the CMSTPLUA COM object, a known technique for UAC bypass, to execute a hidden and non-profile PowerShell process. This behavior is associated with malicious activity chains like RemotePanel or BoundSiphon that aim to achieve elevated execution.
Detects the creation of a Windows service that impersonates the legitimate Windows Time (w32time) service name or display name but utilizes a binary located outside of the standard system32 directory. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism, often used by backdoors like RemotePanel to evade detection after initial compromise.
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