Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects instances where users grant broad permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite) to newly registered or unknown applications. It specifically correlates these grants with device code flow authentication, a technique frequently used in OAuth consent phishing to bypass traditional authentication hurdles.
This rule detects a suspicious process execution chain where the FortiClient scheduler (scheduler.exe) initiates a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe) to execute a batch file, which subsequently launches a PowerShell process with obfuscated or hidden command-line arguments (e.g., -w 1, -enc). This chain is often indicative of post-exploitation activity, specifically related to the FortiBleed vulnerability chain or the deployment of infostealers.
Detects DLL side-loading attempts and suspicious process executions associated with the HijackLoader (wingo) malware distribution chain. The rule monitors for specific common applications loading known vulnerable DLLs from suspicious non-standard directories (e.g., ProgramData, Temp) and tracks rare parent-child process relationships associated with this campaign.
Detects periodic, low-variance network beaconing behavior indicative of the SnappyClient RAT, specifically monitoring for simultaneous connections to control (port 3333) and data (port 3334) ports. The detection utilizes statistical analysis of inter-arrival times (low coefficient of variation) and restricts alerts to rare destination IP addresses contacted by a limited number of internal hosts.
Detects the use of a common PowerShell download cradle (Invoke-Expression with Invoke-RestMethod) targeting a direct IP address. This pattern is frequently observed in 'ClickFix' style attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious commands into their terminal, which then pull secondary payloads from adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects instances where a PowerShell process makes an outbound network connection shortly after its initial launch. This behavior is consistent with ClickFix campaigns or other malicious activity where PowerShell is utilized to download secondary payloads, such as stealers or loaders, directly from the internet.
Detects network requests targeting port 8013 that generate an error message indicating a missing certificate in the request header. This pattern is associated with attempts to exploit vulnerability CVE-2026-35616.
This rule monitors for the loading of a specific driver file, 'pcdhost.sys', followed by a process termination event within a five-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attack pattern, where an adversary loads a vulnerable driver to gain kernel-level access or elevate privileges, often followed by the cleanup or termination of the process that facilitated the loading.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys that point to executable files located in suspicious directories, specifically 'AppData' or 'Temp'. This behavior is a common persistence technique used by malware and adversaries to ensure malicious binaries execute upon user logon.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the wevtutil utility (clearing Security, System, or Application logs) or the native Windows event log clearing event ID 1102 (The audit log was cleared).
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