Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,458 downloads7,120 copies47 likes38,599 views
11,679 detections
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Detects unauthorized modifications to Nginx configuration files by processes other than the Nginx service itself, known package managers, or common configuration management tools. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the injection of proxy directives (e.g., fastcgi_pass, proxy_pass) as observed in the Velvet Ant Operation Highland, used to pivot traffic into protected or air-gapped network segments.
Detects unauthorized systemd service unit installation or modification, specifically targeting reverse shells or encrypted tunneling tools (e.g., gs-netcat, netcat) by monitoring systemctl commands referencing suspicious paths (/tmp, /var/tmp, etc.) that bypass standard package management workflows. This behavior is associated with the Velvet Ant threat group's persistence tactics on compromised Linux systems.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is spawned by Windows Script Host processes (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments indicative of fileless execution or payload decoding, such as the use of hidden windows, encoded commands, or certutil-based file decoding from the ProgramData directory.
Detects high-cardinality, multi-protocol network scanning behavior characteristic of the JDY botnet. The rule identifies internal hosts attempting to connect to a high volume of unique external destinations across multiple protocols with low average bytes per connection, indicative of automated discovery or probing activity.
Detects instances where the creation timestamp of a file is reported as being significantly older (more than 30 days) than the actual file creation event time, as recorded by Sysmon Event ID 2. This is a common indicator of timestomping, where attackers modify file creation metadata to evade detection or blend in with legitimate system files.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious activity pattern where a process performs system reconnaissance (process enumeration followed by network configuration enumeration) followed by an outbound network connection to a non-internal IP address. The rule uses transaction correlation on the ProcessGuid/ParentProcessGuid to link these distinct events into a single chain within a 2-minute time window.
This rule detects scenarios where an application located in Program Files or Program Files (x86) loads an unsigned DLL from its own installation directory. It further correlates this activity by checking if the DLL was recently created (within 48 hours) to identify potentially suspicious new files, which may indicate DLL hijacking or side-loading attempts.
This rule detects processes frequently creating image files (bmp, png, jpg, jpeg) in temporary directories and subsequently initiating external network connections. The logic identifies suspicious patterns where a non-whitelisted process generates files at consistent, short intervals and performs network activity, which is a common indicator of automated screen capture and exfiltration.
Detects the execution of script files (e.g., .js, .jse, .vbs) via Windows Script Host (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) where the parent or grandparent process is a known archive extraction utility (e.g., 7zip, WinRAR). The rule further filters by identifying keywords associated with malicious lures (e.g., 'health', 'medical', 'nhis'). This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns delivering malicious attachments.
Detects instances where script interpreters (wscript/cscript on Windows; sh/bash/busybox on Linux) are used to spawn command-line tools (cmd.exe or rm/unlink) to perform file deletion operations. This is a common pattern for attackers to remove evidence, logs, or tools post-execution.
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