Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects network traffic associated with TrymeLocker malware, specifically targeting Telegram API communications containing hardcoded identifiers and geolocation lookups via ipinfo.io.
Detects suspicious access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process using granted access rights associated with credential dumping tools like Pillager and Cobalt Strike, commonly observed in StrikeShark campaigns.
Detects potential Cobalt Strike Beacon process injection activity by monitoring Sysmon events for suspicious cross-process access (EID 10) and remote thread creation (EID 8). The rule specifically targets high-value host processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, rundll32.exe, notepad.exe) and filters common legitimate behaviors such as antivirus memory scanning and JIT compilation to reduce false positives.
Detects registry run key and logon persistence modifications commonly used by the StrikeShark campaign. This rule monitors for entries in standard Windows autorun registry keys and Winlogon persistence locations where the associated file path is located in user-writable directories (AppData, Temp, Public) or contains suspicious file extension patterns, which are indicative of malware such as Sharkloader.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by an AutoGen Studio agent process. This behavior is indicative of the AutoJack exploit chain, where an attacker leverages an unauthenticated MCP WebSocket endpoint (/api/mcp/ws/) to execute arbitrary OS commands on the host by passing base64-encoded StdioServerParams.
Detects the execution of the FScan tool, used by the StrikeShark threat actor for internal network reconnaissance, port scanning, and host discovery. The rule triggers on common binary names associated with FScan and specific command-line arguments indicative of scanning activity, such as CIDR range targeting and port flags, while excluding other known network utilities.
Detects the unauthorized access or copying of the Active Directory NTDS.dit database file, a common credential harvesting technique. The rule monitors for the execution of ntdsutil.exe or vssadmin.exe with arguments typically used to create shadow copies or extract the NTDS database, specifically when executed by cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
Detects the use of the SharpGPOAbuse tool, typically used for modifying Group Policy Objects for persistence or privilege escalation, in conjunction with rapid Active Directory group enumeration (using net.exe or net1.exe) on the same host within a 5-minute window. This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary performing post-exploitation reconnaissance and privilege escalation activities.
Detects unauthorized inbound WebSocket connections from external (non-private) IP addresses to the AutoGen Studio MCP API endpoint at /api/mcp/ws/ on port 8081, followed by the execution of interpreter processes (autogenstudio, uvicorn, or python) on the same host, indicating a potential exploitation of an origin validation bypass for remote code execution.
This rule detects instances where the Windows Update service (wusvc.exe) loads a module or file while simultaneously initiating a process. This behavior is often associated with process injection or the misuse of legitimate system binaries (LOLBins) to facilitate malicious activities by proxying execution through trusted services.
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