Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,053 copies47 likes38,393 views
11,679 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,760
1,874
1,586
966
944
Categories
4,878
3,246
1,529
1,303
1,122
Platforms
7,678
1,824
1,066
999
986
Products / Services
2,963
1,768
1,278
953
798
MITRE Techniques
3,615
3,555
2,488
1,474
1,186
CVEs
36
27
26
25
23
IDS Classtypes
360
113
38
24
24
IDS Protocols
315
114
93
47
10
Detects wermgr.exe masquerading outside legitimate system directories, associated with the Nightmare Eclipse exploit chain.
This rule detects crashes in Nginx worker processes, specifically looking for messages indicating a 'signal 11' or 'SIGSEGV' error. This could be indicative of a vulnerability being exploited (e.g., CVE-2026-42945) or other critical software malfunctions.
Detects the self-deletion pattern used by the Supper backdoor, which involves a specific 'ping' command delay structure followed by a 'Del /f /q' command to remove itself from disk after execution. This pattern has been associated with Interlock and Rhysida ransomware.
Detects UNG002's loader spawning discovery tools to enumerate running processes.
Detects the automated scraping of Telegram/Teletype pages by scripts to resolve dynamic C2 IP addresses.
Detects curl.exe where system metadata is concatenated into User-Agent/Referer fields with specific delimiters.
Identifies PowerShell utilizing rstrtmgr.dll to list processes, avoiding Get-Process.
Detects the use of the `sysadminctl` utility with the `addUser` or `-addUser` command-line arguments, which can be used to create new user accounts on macOS systems. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistences by creating new accounts.
Attempts to discover running processes on a Windows system using either native utilities or PowerShell commands/API calls. Adversaries often use these methods to gain information about running processes as part of discovery.
Hunting rule, not a drop in detection
Hunting rule, not a drop in detection
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
Page 913 of 1168