Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects the loading of amsi.dll by processes frequently associated with PyInstaller or potential AMSI patching attempts. This rule monitors EventCode 7 (ImageLoad) events specifically identifying instances where amsi.dll is loaded by processes containing '_mei' (a common temporary directory prefix for PyInstaller), python executables running from temporary directories, or processes named 'winupdate.exe'. Such activity is often observed during the execution of obfuscated or packaged malicious binaries attempting to disable or bypass AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface).
This rule detects suspicious activities commonly associated with the Yuta/Glove information stealer, including the creation of specific file paths in AppData, the execution of binaries from user-writable directories, and potential process hollowing or side-loading behaviors. It monitors process creation (Event ID 1) and file creation (Event ID 11) for indicators like winupdate.exe, PyInstaller-related temporary directories, and known malicious file hashes.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read LevelDB or credential storage files belonging to common Electron-based applications (Discord, Signal, Slack, Teams, Telegram). This behavior is characteristic of info-stealer malware like Yuta or Glove Stealer that target browser and application-based session tokens.
Detects the Yuta/Glove Stealer malware (winupdate.exe) performing environment checks by querying Windows registry keys associated with virtualization software (VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU). This behavior is indicative of sandbox evasion techniques used to detect analysis environments before executing secondary payloads.
Detects evidence of Yuta/Glove Stealer malware establishing persistence. The rule monitors for unauthorized registry modifications to Windows Run keys pointing to suspicious paths (AppData, Temp) or specific files ('winupdate.exe'), and the creation of files within the Windows Startup folder using specific naming conventions such as 'WindowsDefenderAgent' or 'winupdate'.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities including wevtutil.exe, PowerShell, or through direct event log event ID triggers (1102, 104). This activity is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their presence on a system.
This rule monitors for the execution of QEMU processes and the creation of virtual disk files (.qcow2, .vmdk) in non-standard locations. It also identifies potentially disguised VM images by detecting files with suspicious extensions (.db, .dll) created in sensitive paths like Temp or AppData, which may indicate an attempt to hide virtualized environments or disk images.
This rule monitors for the creation or modification of files containing the string 'readme_locker' in their filename. This pattern is commonly associated with ransomware strains that leave behind ransom notes, often as part of the data encryption impact phase.
Detects the execution of known remote access software (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Rclone, ScreenConnect) from non-standard file paths or when launched by suspicious parent processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or script interpreters. This behavior is indicative of potential adversary usage of living-off-the-land techniques or lateral movement via third-party remote access utilities.
Detects instances where critical Windows host processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or lsass.exe) spawn a new process, which is a common behavioral indicator of process injection or post-exploitation activity. The rule excludes common, legitimate system-level causality chains.
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