Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,050 copies47 likes38,351 views
11,679 detections
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Detects the creation of files in the 'C:\ProgramData\Windows Multimedia\' directory, specifically files named 'ROG', which is indicative of JFMBackdoor staging captured screenshots using GDI+ functions.
Detects the execution of Red Lamassu's JFMBackdoor payload by monitoring for fltMC.exe being launched from temporary directories. The rule identifies a sideloading technique where fltMC.exe loads a malicious FLTLIB.dll, which then injects the flt.bin shellcode stub into memory, avoiding writing the malicious PE file to disk.
Detects the co-occurrence of JFMBackdoor DLL sideloading via fltMC.exe and an additional PlugX DLL sideloading event originating from a temporary directory on the same host. This pattern is indicative of the Red Lamassu actor group deploying shared tooling for lateral movement and persistence.
Detects the execution of JScript Encoded (.jse) files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe when spawned by Office applications or email clients. This pattern is indicative of Kimsuky initial stage payloads, where a malicious lure file is dropped into a user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) and subsequently executed.
Detects malicious PowerShell command lines exhibiting multi-stage base64 decoding patterns characteristic of the Kimsuky NUKESPED JSE loader. The rule identifies suspicious chaining of base64 decoding (FromBase64String) with execution primitives (Invoke-Expression, IEX), unicode encoding specifications, or EncodedCommand arguments used to bypass security controls and deobfuscate stage-two payloads.
Detects the execution of short (6-10 characters), randomized alphanumeric executables located in typically writeable directories like ProgramData or Temp. The detection triggers when these files are spawned by common scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe), which is a characteristic behavioral pattern for the Kimsuky NUKESPED malware's secondary stage where a JSE dropper executes a renamed payload.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows services using sc.exe or PowerShell New-Service where the binary path points to suspicious user-writable directories such as Temp or AppData, a technique observed in the Red Lamassu JFMBackdoor infection chain.
Detects the JDY botnet's infection chain on Linux systems, characterized by script-based processor architecture reconnaissance followed by the retrieval, execution, and subsequent deletion of architecture-specific (MIPS) binaries. This rule monitors shell-based command sequences involving system information gathering, network-based file downloads, and immediate removal of the downloaded file.
Detects the loading of graphics-related DLLs (gdiplus.dll, gdi32.dll, gdi32full.dll) by processes executing from typically writable directories such as Temp, AppData, or ProgramData. This behavior is consistent with the screen capture functionality of the JFMBackdoor (Red Lamassu), which utilizes these libraries to capture, encode, and stage screen images.
Detects potential persistence via the creation of suspicious systemd service files. The rule monitors for new service files created by non-package manager processes, correlates these with subsequent 'systemctl enable' or 'start' operations, and identifies the execution of binaries from non-standard directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) by the systemd process.
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