Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
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11,679 detections
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Detects a sequence of events where an Amazon S3 bucket is deleted, followed within one hour by the creation of an Amazon Data Firehose delivery stream or an update to a destination using the same bucket name. This pattern indicates a potential bucket name hijacking attempt, where an attacker recreates the deleted bucket to intercept or redirect data streams processed by Firehose.
Detects the RemotePC RMM component (rpccmdhost.exe) being used to spawn PowerShell processes with suspicious command-line arguments. The rule specifically looks for evidence of hidden PowerShell execution designed to bypass TLS certificate validation and download external scripts or stagers from a known C2 IP address associated with ROOTBOY activity.
Detects the node.exe process deleting its own executing script file 'setup.cjs' located within an 'easy-day-js' node_modules directory. This behavior is indicative of the anti-forensics self-deletion mechanism used by the easy-day-js supply chain dropper to remove its footprint after executing a subsequent malicious payload.
Detects a potential storage container hijacking attack in Azure, where a container is deleted in one subscription and subsequently recreated with the same name in a different subscription within the same tenant. This sequence can be used to redirect data streams or intercept access to containerized resources.
Detects unauthorized file access to browser extension directories and credential stores (History, Login Data) by a suspicious Node.js process named 'protocal.cjs'. This activity is characteristic of the 'easy-day-js' supply chain compromise, where a malicious backdoor attempts to exfiltrate browser-stored credentials and history from Chrome, Edge, and Brave browsers.
Detects the use of reg.exe to add a 'NvmProtocal' entry to the Windows Registry Run key (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run). This behavior is indicative of a backdoor establishing persistence by scheduling the execution of node.exe with a hidden PowerShell window upon user logon.
Detects potential GCP logging sink bucket hijacking by monitoring for the deletion of a Google Cloud Storage bucket followed closely by an update to a logging sink configuration that points to a GCS destination. This pattern is characteristic of attackers attempting to intercept cloud log streams by recreating a target destination bucket in an environment they control.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with HijackLoader delivered via ErrTraffic ClickFix lures. The rule identifies a sequence where a web browser spawns a PowerShell process that subsequently creates a large archive file (binary bloating), followed by the execution of suspicious processes (often associated with process injection/hollowing) from the extracted context.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read sensitive application data directories (specifically for Telegram and Discord) on macOS. This behavior is indicative of infostealer malware, such as AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer), attempting to exfiltrate session tokens and account information.
Detects communication between a macOS host and the Telegram Bot API using the 'getUpdates' method. This behavior is indicative of the 'Gaslight' malware family using Telegram as a command-and-control (C2) channel via polling, typically characterized by repeated HTTP requests to 'api.telegram.org'.
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