nomit vyas
@xoxoTrusted contributorCompletionist
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694 detections
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Detects the deployment of MeshCentral remote access agents and the creation of a specific ransom note file on compromised PeopleSoft servers, indicative of ShinyHunters activity. The rule identifies the MeshCentral agent by process image name and common deployment paths or by its execution via common shell/download utilities. It also looks for the creation of the ransom note file 'README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOU-VE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT'.
Detects network connections to known ShinyHunters infrastructure, identified by specific IP addresses and DNS queries for 'azurenetfiles.net'. This activity is associated with the exploitation of Oracle PeopleSoft servers via gadget chain exploitation.
Detects regsvr32.exe loading DLLs from user-writable directories such as Temp, AppData, ProgramData, Downloads, Desktop, and Public. Legitimate DLL registration runs from System32 or Program Files - execution from these paths indicates LOLBin abuse for proxy execution, DLL sideloading, or defense evasion commonly used to launch malware payloads.
Detects a Node.js process spawning a detached JavaScript file with a randomly generated 24-character hexadecimal filename in a temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of the stage-2 payload execution observed in the Mastra npm supply chain attack (easy-day-js typosquat).
Detects a Node.js process spawning a detached JavaScript file with a randomly generated 24-character hexadecimal filename in a temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of the stage-2 payload execution observed in the Mastra npm supply chain attack (easy-day-js typosquat).
Detects processes accessing credential store paths across browsers, FTP clients, email, SSH, and IM clients in a pattern consistent with Pony (Fareit/Siplog) modular credential grabber walking well-known AppData credential store locations. The rule specifically looks for file read or access actions on common credential files within typical application data directories, while excluding legitimate processes that would normally access these files.
This rule detects attempts to add a file or path exclusion to Microsoft Defender using the WMI command-line tool (wmic.exe/wmice.exe). This is a known defense evasion technique used by malware to prevent detection.
Detects script content that invokes 'mshta.exe' from the 'SysWOW64' directory to access a remote resource ending with '.7z' via HTTP or HTTPS. This pattern is associated with the Animateclipper malware, which uses MSHTA for initial access or execution of malicious scripts.
Detects modifications to common Windows Registry Run keys (Run, RunOnce, RunServices, RunServicesOnce) that include specific keywords ('ManageEngine', 'SystemOptimizer') and reference scripting tools ('wscript', 'cscript', 'powershell', 'cmd') in the RegistryValueData. This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish persistence on a system by ensuring their malicious scripts or commands are executed upon user login or system startup.
Detects instances where 'node.exe' executes 'protocal.cjs' from 'NodePackages' paths, subsequently spawning child processes that perform host reconnaissance activities. These activities include PowerShell registry queries and process listing commands, indicative of potential malicious behavior.
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