Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands to install unsigned AppX packages using Add-AppxPackage or Add-AppPackage cmdlets with the -AllowUnsigned flag. This activity is significant as adversaries may use unsigned AppX packages to install malicious applications, bypass security controls, or establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to install unauthorized applications that may contain malware, backdoors, or other malicious components.
Detects data exfiltration performed by the Vice Society ransomware gang using a custom built PowerShell script. More precisely, the script enumerates the volumes mounted on the system, then starts crawling the different directories before initiating the data exfiltration over HTTP by creating multiple different jobs. As PowerShell script block logs the script execution into multiple events, the detection aggregates the different log chunks using the ScriptBlockId and then ensure that at least 3 of the 4 detection strings are found.
Detects the execution of a suspicious PowerShell dropper script, often initiated by a user clicking a malicious file (e.g., LNK). This pattern is common in phishing campaigns, including those by groups like Kimsuky. The detection looks for PowerShell commands that use common evasion techniques (like hidden windows or bypassing execution policies).
Detects PowerShell preparing to execute shellcode using the CallWindowProc API. This technique is used to bypass EDRs by executing code without creating a new thread, which is a commonly monitored API call.
Detects defense evasion tactics used by UpCrypter, such as checking for forensic tools or sandbox environments.
Detects PowerShell commands, particularly those involving download and execution cradles (irm/iex), being written to the RunMRU registry key. This behavior is indicative of social engineering attacks like 'ClickFix' where users are tricked into pasting and running malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog.
This rule detects PowerShell command line execution by user accounts. It specifically looks for `PowerShellCommand` events where the `InitiatingProcessFileName` is `powershell.exe` and the `InitiatingProcessAccountName` is not 'system'. It also ensures that both `ProcessCommandLine` and `InitiatingProcessCommandLine` are not empty. This helps monitor PowerShell usage across endpoints, detect suspicious or unauthorized script execution, and investigate potential lateral movement or remote access.
This rule detects potential obfuscated or stealthy PowerShell execution by identifying PowerShell commands that do not use the default 'powershell' or 'pwsh' executable names but still contain common PowerShell command-line arguments such as '-NoProfile', '-ExecutionPolicy', or 'Invoke-Expression'. It correlates these executions with user logon sessions to aid in attribution and threat hunting.
This rule detects PowerShell activity on user workstations within 30 minutes of receiving an email from a known malicious sender. It aims to identify potential post-compromise activity initiated by a successful phishing attempt.
The analytic identifies the execution of PowerShell scripts from the WindowsApps directory, which is a common technique used in malicious MSIX package execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command lines and parent process paths. This activity is significant as adversaries have been observed using MSIX packages with embedded PowerShell scripts (particularly StartingScriptWrapper.ps1) to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, or deliver malware while evading traditional detection mechanisms.
Detects reflective loading of .NET assemblies from memory within PowerShell. This technique is often used to execute malicious code while bypassing file-based detections and some AMSI features, as the assembly is loaded directly from a byte array rather than from a file on disk.
A new RoKRAT variant tied to APT37 delivers payloads via oversized LNK shortcuts, executing a two‑stage encrypted shellcode loader that uses steganography to conceal content. The malware achieves fileless execution by injecting into trusted processes (e.g., mspaint.exe, notepad.exe) and hides C2 activity within legitimate cloud storage services such as pCloud, Yandex Disk, and Dropbox, often leveraging hardcoded API tokens.
High‑level TTPs:
Initial Access: Malicious LNK files in compressed archives.
Execution & Persistence: PowerShell/BAT‑driven staged loaders with XOR decryption.
Defense Evasion: Process injection into signed Windows binaries; steganography for payload concealment.
Command & Control: Use of trusted cloud service APIs with embedded tokens to obfuscate malicious traffic.
High‑level TTPs:
Initial Access: Malicious LNK files in compressed archives.
Execution & Persistence: PowerShell/BAT‑driven staged loaders with XOR decryption.
Defense Evasion: Process injection into signed Windows binaries; steganography for payload concealment.
Command & Control: Use of trusted cloud service APIs with embedded tokens to obfuscate malicious traffic.
Detects suspicious service installation scripts
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands from a headless ConHost process. The '--headless' flag is used to hide the console window from the user, which can be leveraged by adversaries for stealthy execution.
Detects .lnk (shortcut) files launched by scripting engines (e.g., PowerShell, CMD, WScript) exhibiting suspicious traits like hidden execution, embedded commands, or admin privilege requests. Common in phishing, LOLBin abuse, and initial access.
This rule detects PowerShell script blocks that attempt to bypass AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) by patching or manipulating memory related to AMSI. It specifically looks for the presence of keywords like 'VirtualProtect', 'GetProcAddress', 'InteropServices', 'AmsiScanBuffer', and references to 'amsi.dll' or 'clr.dll' within PowerShell operational logs (EventID 4104). This combination of keywords indicates an attempt to programmatically interfere with AMSI's ability to scan script content.
Vidar is a sophisticated infostealer operating as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS). Written in C++, it’s designed to harvest a wide range of sensitive data from infected systems and exfiltrate it to attacker controlled infrastructure.
🧬 Script Inception: PowerShell scripts nested within PowerShell scripts, layered with 2–3 rounds of Base64 encoding.
📦 RAR Payloads: Password protected RAR files downloaded via direct-to-IP HTTP requests over TCP port 80. Passwords are embedded in encoded scripts and passed via command line to a downloaded copy of "unrar.exe".
🧬 Script Inception: PowerShell scripts nested within PowerShell scripts, layered with 2–3 rounds of Base64 encoding.
📦 RAR Payloads: Password protected RAR files downloaded via direct-to-IP HTTP requests over TCP port 80. Passwords are embedded in encoded scripts and passed via command line to a downloaded copy of "unrar.exe".
Detects PowerShell obfuscation techniques in process command lines, including encoded commands, IEX with string manipulation, and long command lines with string functions, indicating potential malicious activity. The rule specifically looks for the use of '-encodedcommand' or its short forms with long command lines, 'iex' or 'invoke-expression' combined with string manipulation (like '+', '-join', '[char]', 'frombase64string') or very long command lines, and unusually long command lines that also contain string manipulation functions ('-join', 'replace', 'split').
Detects PowerShell commands that use Get-WmiObject to query Win32_Process, specifically looking for process names. This can be indicative of discovery or reconnaissance activities using WMI.
This activity may indicate that a threat actor is performing process discovery to gather information such as the Process ID, executable path, command-line arguments, and other related data.
This activity may indicate that a threat actor is performing process discovery to gather information such as the Process ID, executable path, command-line arguments, and other related data.
Vidar is a sophisticated infostealer operating as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS). Written in C++, it’s designed to harvest a wide range of sensitive data from infected systems and exfiltrate it to attacker controlled infrastructure.
🧬 Script Inception: PowerShell scripts nested within PowerShell scripts, layered with 2–3 rounds of Base64 encoding.
📦 RAR Payloads: Password protected RAR files downloaded via direct-to-IP HTTP requests over TCP port 80. Passwords are embedded in encoded scripts and passed via command line to a downloaded copy of "unrar.exe".
🧬 Script Inception: PowerShell scripts nested within PowerShell scripts, layered with 2–3 rounds of Base64 encoding.
📦 RAR Payloads: Password protected RAR files downloaded via direct-to-IP HTTP requests over TCP port 80. Passwords are embedded in encoded scripts and passed via command line to a downloaded copy of "unrar.exe".
Detects the usage of PowerDodder, a post-exploitation persistence tool that appends malicious commands to existing script files by hijacking their execution flow.
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