Ankit Mehta
@SecvynIndiaTrusted contributorCompletionist
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8,655 detections
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This rule detects VBScript execution (via wscript.exe or cscript.exe) that attempts to load WinHTTP objects (WinHttpRequest.5.1, MSXML2.XMLHTTP) or uses generic object creation functions (CreateObject, GetObject). This behavior is often associated with VBScripts establishing command and control (C2) communication or performing data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of a Go binary named 'servertool.exe' or any executable containing 'servertool' in its command line, when combined with suspicious command-line arguments indicative of file deletion or directory traversal, while excluding common system directories like 'Program Files' and 'Windows'. This rule aims to identify activity associated with the Prinz Eugen ransomware.
Detects the execution of RemotePC (IDriveRemotePC.exe, RemotePC.exe, IDrive.exe) by common scripting or command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments. This could indicate abuse of legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software for malicious purposes, such as by ransomware.
Detects suspicious installation attempts of ManageEngine Endpoint Central (ADSelfService.exe) potentially associated with Prinz Eugen ransomware. The rule looks for silent installation parameters or execution initiated by PowerShell or Cmd.exe, which could indicate malicious deployment.
Detects Kerberos Authentication Service Requests (AS-REQ) where the pre-authentication type is set to 0. This is a characteristic indicator of legacy authentication or potentially malicious activity, such as Kerberoasting or brute-force attempts targeting the authentication service.
Detects NTLM network logons (LogonType 3) where the workstation name does not match the target computer name and is not a machine account. This pattern is commonly associated with lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash or other credential relay attacks, where an adversary authenticates to a remote system using compromised credentials.
This rule detects high-volume connection requests to LDAP services (default ports 389, 636, 3268, 3269). A high number of connections from a single source to a destination within a short time window may indicate automated reconnaissance, LDAP enumeration, or brute-force attempts against domain services.
Detects successful sign-ins by accounts that appear to be Azure AD Connect synchronization service accounts (e.g., 'MSOL_', 'Sync_', 'AADConnect') but are not initiating from the expected Microsoft Azure Active Directory Connect application. This may indicate an adversary attempting to use these highly privileged service accounts for unauthorized access or lateral movement.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows scheduled tasks using Security Event IDs 4698 and 4702. This rule parses the event data to extract key task information such as task name, command, arguments, and the author of the task.
Detects Kerberos Authentication Service Requests (AS-REQ) where the pre-authentication type is set to 0. This is a characteristic indicator of legacy authentication or potentially malicious activity, such as Kerberoasting or brute-force attempts targeting the authentication service.
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